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Paving the Way to Religious Acceptance 
Please Don’t Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical 
History of the Separation of Church and State 
by Stephen M. Feldman 
New York University Press (1997) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
America has long been known as a “melting pot,” referring 
to the diversity found within American culture. Nowhere is this 
diversity more evident than in the many different religions 
Americans profess. Undoubtedly, religion can play a large part 
in any person’s life; religious views help shape a believer’s self-
identity and the way he views the world around him. As a re-
sult, society—and to a large extent, the law, which is shaped by 
society—is viewed and formed through the prism of the various 
religious perspectives present in America. Stephen Feldman’s 
book, Please Don’t Wish Me a Merry Christmas,1 is a good start 
to awakening the conscience—to seeing the law and its progeny 
from various religious perspectives. However, Feldman’s inabil-
ity to view the problem from a perspective other than his own 
undermines his potentially significant contribution. 
Feldman argues that the Christian majority in America has 
condemned “the Jews,” the “prototypical religious outgroup” or 
religious “other,” and thereby deprived them of their religious 
freedom.2 Central to American Christianity, according to Feld-
man, is the opposition of Jewish carnality and Christian spiri-
tuality: “the New Testament emphasized a dualism” by 
“characteriz[ing] and revil[ing] the Jews as carnal, while Chris-
tians were revered as spiritual.”3 Feldman concludes that this 
 
 1. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON’T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS (1997). 
 2. Id. at 7. 
 3. Id. at 14. 
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central tenet has, in turn, been the basis for the development of 
an anti-Semitic church and state jurisprudence in America.4 
Based on this conclusion, Feldman argues that religion should 
be eliminated from the American social and political arenas.5 
This Book Review critiques Feldman’s thesis from the per-
spective of a Mormon Christian, recognizing that Mormonism 
is a distinct and minority denomination within Feldman’s gen-
eralization of a Christian America. Not only are Feldman’s 
generalizations unfair, they are offensive to those Christians 
who are not considered part of the Christian majority. In effect, 
through his narrative, Feldman personifies what he so despises 
in the status of religion in America: the intolerance of the 
“other.” Instead of completely eliminating religious discussion 
or belief from the political sphere, as Feldman urges, I argue 
that the recent Supreme Court trend of government neutrality 
towards religion is a better proposal. By treating religion or 
nonreligion in a neutral matter, neither endorsing nor disfavor-
ing one over the other, Americans can more readily enjoy the 
inalienable right of their freedom to worship according to their 
conscience, whatever that may personally mean. 
II.  FELDMAN’S DOMINANT STORY OF THE SEPARATION OF 
CHURCH AND STATE 
Feldman begins his critical social narrative by instructing 
his reader that “nearly all discussions of the religion clauses 
build upon one dominant or standard story of the separation of 
church and state.”6 Feldman believes that this almost univer-
sally accepted story is the assumption “that at some point in 
the history of the United States, religious freedom and equality 
triumphed over persecution, oppression, and injustice.”7 
According to the author, this dominant story, which has 
been perpetuated since the founding of the United States, 
stands on two faulty propositions. The first proposition is the 
popular belief that the separation of church and state doctrine 
equally protects the religious majority and minority.8 Feldman 
argues that rather than creating religious equality, the separa-
 
 4. See id. at 7. 
 5. See id. at 286. 
 6. Id. at 4. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. 
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tion principle has largely permitted the majority religion in 
America—Christianity—to develop a hegemonic hold over both 
American political and social discourse. As a result, religious 
“outgroups,”9 namely Judaism, suffer at the hands of a power-
ful majority.  
Feldman’s second erroneous proposition is that this princi-
ple of separation, which many mistakenly believe arose for the 
first time in the American experience, created religious free-
dom and equality for the oppressed.10 Feldman argues that “the 
dominant story appears in different guises only because writers 
disagree about when (and not whether) religious liberty as-
cended to victory.”11 Thus, scholars fail to consider whether  
religious freedom has truly triumphed over persecution and 
inequality, thereby rendering their subsequent analyses in-
complete. According to Feldman, these two faulty propositions 
work together to reinforce American Christianity’s hegemonic 
hold over all other religious outgroups. 
After describing these two flaws of the dominant story of 
church and state, Feldman sets out to dispel the theories by 
explaining the “development of Christian social power vis-à-vis 
the state and religious outgroups.”12 Feldman begins his analy-
sis with the emergence of Christianity in Israel, contending 
that the New Testament “decidedly condemned (and still con-
demns) Judaism as a religion and Jews as a people.”13 The au-
thor then traces the interplay between Christianity and the 
state throughout history, culminating in his discussion of mod-
ern Supreme Court cases.14 While the Court, legal scholars, and 
historians praise the Court’s decisions for “fulfill[ing] the 
American principle of religious liberty,”15 Feldman contests this 
viewpoint. Instead, Feldman asserts that the Court “conceptu-
alizes religion in distinctly Christian terms,”16 and by so doing, 
continues to relegate America’s religious outgroups to the 
realm of “other.” 
 
 9. Throughout Feldman’s work, the author refers to non-Christian religions as 
“religious outgroups.” In keeping with Feldman’s vocabulary, this Book Review will 
also use “religious outgroups” to refer to non-Christian and minority religions. 
10. See FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 4. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 10. 
14. See id. at 246. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
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III.  CRITIQUE THROUGH A MORMON CHRISTIAN’S PERSPECTIVE 
A.  Is Christianity Truly Based on Anti-Semitic Rhetoric? 
To be sure, providing a brief synopsis of the separation of 
church and state is an overwhelming feat, and Feldman makes 
a good attempt at synthesizing history, political theory, phi-
losophy, theology, and sociology. However noble Feldman’s in-
tentions, he largely undermines his work’s validity by continu-
ally, and at times somewhat tediously, premising a historical 
analysis on his belief that Christianity is based on anti-Semitic 
sentiments. “[T]he peculiar condemnation of ‘the Jews,’ ” he 
claims, “not only has been the root source of antisemitism but 
also has been enormously important to the development of 
Christianity and the state.”17 
Furthermore, Feldman fails to account for the seemingly 
anti-Semitic language found replete throughout the Old Tes-
tament. The Old Testament traces the history of the Jewish 
people, describing their fall from grace when Adam and Eve 
first partook of the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden,18 and 
man’s subsequent experiences and offerings in the carnal 
world. One would be hard-pressed to turn more than five pages 
in any version of the Old Testament and not find an angry God 
or ancient prophet chastising the people for their wickedness 
and inherently evil nature.19 
Admittedly, the New Testament is different from the Old 
Testament in that it recounts a history of the Christians in ad-
dition to the Jews. However, both Testaments contain what 
could be characterized as anti-Semitic rhetoric. When the lan-
guage of the two Testaments is compared, Feldman’s argument 
that the New Testament is uniquely anti-Semitic loses much of 
its luster because similar negative passages can be found in 
both Testaments. For example, from the very first book of the 
Old Testament, man is described as carnal and evil: “And God 
saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and 
that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only 
 
17. Id. at 7. 
18. See Genesis 3:1-24 (King James). 
19. See, e.g., Genesis 8:21 (King James) (stating that the “imagination of man’s 
heart is evil”); 2 Kings 17:17 (King James) (observing that the people “sold themselves 
to do evil”); Isaiah 59:7 (King James) (commenting that “man’s feet run to evil”). 
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evil continually.”20 A similar statement, referring to man’s in-
herently evil nature, can be found in the New Testament: “For 
from within, out of the heart of men, proceed evil thoughts, 
adulteries, fornications, murders, [t]hefts, covetousness, wick-
edness, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride, 
foolishness: All these evil things come from within, and defile 
the man.”21 Importantly, this passage speaks of all men—not 
just the Jews in particular, as Feldman would propose. 
By relentlessly reiterating his theme of the anti-Semitic ba-
sis of Christianity, Feldman robs his arguments of much of 
their force. There is no question that when various religious be-
liefs are posed against one another, differences in doctrine and 
interpretation emerge. Because of this, it is frustrating and 
unproductive to debate the merits of one’s religious beliefs by 
merely repeatedly dismissing the beliefs of another. For exam-
ple, irrespective of the number of times Feldman reiterates his 
belief that Christianity is based on anti-Semitic rhetoric, he 
will hardly convince his Christian reader of this fact. Rather, 
Feldman’s resentment resonates throughout the work, causing 
his reader to distrust the validity and objectivity of his aca-
demic assertions. Further, it is questionable for Feldman to as-
sume he knows what is taught in each Christian sect. 
B.  A Missing Solution 
This presumption that Feldman knows and understands 
the teachings of the various sects within the Christian religion 
underscores an even larger problem with his analysis: after 
chronicling the infinite instances of Jewish subjugation at the 
hands of the Christian majority, Feldman fails to provide any 
realistic solutions to rectify the problems he sees in the domi-
nant story of the separation of church and state. Instead of of-
fering solutions, Feldman’s book demonstrates that as the reli-
gious “other,” he is not willing to reach a compromise with the 
religious majority. 
For example, in the concluding section of his book, entitled 
“Final Thoughts: A Political Statement,” Feldman chronicles 
examples of “attitudes and actions toward Jews”22 that demon-
strate his assertion of the consistent intrusion of Christian be-
 
20. Genesis 6:5 (King James). 
21. Mark 7:21-23 (King James). 
22. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 282. 
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liefs and ideals on religious outgroups. This list of examples of 
Christian domination is helpful in demonstrating how perva-
sive Christian attitudes are in American society. For example, 
Feldman notes that when his daughter, who is Jewish, wanted 
to order a Thanksgiving book from a scholastic book club, she 
could not do so without ordering a Christmas book as well.23 
Seemingly innocuous examples such as this highlight the valid-
ity of portions of Feldman’s assertions. 
While Feldman’s examples of daily Christian domination 
are poignant, he goes too far in proposing a complete divorce 
from religion in the social context. Rather than propounding a 
workable compromise, Feldman reasons that references to re-
ligion should be eliminated from all social discourse. For exam-
ple, Feldman encourages his readers not to wish one another a 
“Merry Christmas,” because doing so only further promotes the 
subjugation of the religious minority.24 This goal of completely 
removing religious references from the public and social sector 
is not only of questionable value but is unrealistic. The very na-
ture of religious belief presupposes that religious values and 
teachings will carry over into a follower’s daily activities. To 
require a believer to keep his religious beliefs only in the realm 
of “religion,” in effect, is to undermine many religionists’ ulti-
mate goal of incorporating religious values and beliefs into 
every aspect of their lives. Perhaps a better, more effective so-
lution is to continue to pursue a neutral perspective vis-à-vis 
religious and nonreligious groups, whether or not they compose 
a majority or minority of the American population. By so doing, 
Americans can properly claim their inalienable right to follow a 
particular faith or to refrain from doing so altogether. 
C.  The Supreme Court and a Vision of Neutrality 
A good place to start in establishing this neutrality is by 
turning to the example of the United States Supreme Court. In 
recent years, there has been a noticeable shift in the Court’s 
church-state jurisprudence from accommodation to neutrality.25 
 
23. See id. at 283. 
24. See id. at 286. 
25. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (holding that estab-
lishing a separate school for Jewish handicapped children only was an unconstitutional 
establishment of religion); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973) (holding that “[a] proper respect for both the Free Exercise 
and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of ‘neutrality’ to-
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Ideally, a neutral perspective provides for “a government that 
reflects interdenominational non-favoritism.”26 This shift to a 
formal neutrality can effectively safeguard the balance of the 
separation of church and state. Rather than requiring complete 
elimination or total endorsement of religion in the public 
sphere, a neutral perspective protects individual religious free-
dom while simultaneously preventing excessive government 
entanglement in the religious arena. 
Two main principles are involved in the Court’s recent neu-
tral approach to church-state jurisprudence.27 First, govern-
ment action will be considered neutral if it grants benefits, 
such as tax exemptions, access to public facilities, and special 
accommodations, even-handedly to all religions, large or 
small.28 By so doing, the government does not favor or dis-
criminate against any one religion. Second, religious activity 
must be given the same treatment—no more, no less—than 
non-religious activity.29 Thus, for example, in Rosenberger v. 
Rector of the University of Virginia, the Supreme Court decided 
under this neutral approach that the University of Virginia 
had to subsidize a student publication that was religious and 
evangelical in nature if the university subsidized all other stu-
dent-run publications.30 The overriding theme of this neutral 
approach is equality and parity, two concepts central to First 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
Under this definition of neutrality, there will be times 
when, as a result of government legislation or judicial reason-
ing, religion will benefit at the expense of nonreligion, or a mi-
nority religion at the expense of the majority.31 However, the 
 
ward religion”); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (holding that an Arkan-
sas statute making it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or university 
to teach about evolution was an unconstitutional establishment of religion); see also 
Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 505 (1998); Christine A. Atkinson, Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties 
Union—Permissible v. Impermissible Government Display of Religious Symbols: The 
Trend Toward a Perspective of Neutrality, 11 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 727 (1991); 
Michal R. Belknap, God and the Warren Court: The Quest for “A Wholesome Neutral-
ity,” 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 401 (1999). 
26. Shivakumar, supra note 25, at 505. 
27. See id. at 515. 
28. See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 714 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
29. See Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995). 
30. See id. at 845-46. 
31. For example, see Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990), where the Court held that a facially neutral, generally applicable law 
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converse of both situations will also inevitably be true: a com-
pletely neutral perspective disregards religion and, therefore, 
applies evenhandedly to all groups. Neutrality does not inher-
ently mean that minority religions or nonreligious people will 
be discriminated against. Rather, neutrality prevents the gov-
ernment from favoring one religion over another, or religion 
over nonreligion—exactly what the First Amendment requires. 
D.  A Good Beginning 
Feldman’s work has merit because it awakens the reader to 
the discrimination that followers of non-Christian religions 
(and minority sects within the Christian religion) encounter. 
Precisely because religion can be so encompassing in every as-
pect of a believer’s life, whether it be morally, politically, cul-
turally, or theologically, it is important to understand the 
views of others. As Professor Balkin states: 
If we do not investigate the relationship between our social 
situation and our perspectives, we may confuse our concep-
tion of what is reasonable with Reason itself. If we do not see 
how our reason is both enabled and limited by our position, 
we may think our judgments positionless and universal. We 
may find the perspectives of those differently situated unrea-
sonable, bizarre, and even dangerous, or we may not even 
recognize the possibility of another way of looking at things.32 
Because of the undeniable tendency to make decisions and 
form social policy in accordance with one’s own beliefs, there is 
no question that the Christian majority in America often im-
poses its beliefs into the political system. The courts today, par-
ticularly the United States Supreme Court, need to protect and 
defend minority religious groups against the majority’s usurpa-
tion of their rights. Feldman’s work begins to awaken readers 
to the existence of these issues. 
Despite the usefulness of this book as an awakening 
mechanism, Feldman’s work can only be used in a limited 
 
will pass constitutional muster even if it outlaws a central practice of a minority relig-
ion. The Native American use of peyote was at issue in Smith, and the Court held that 
the defendants could not ignore neutral laws of general applicability, despite their 
right of freedom of religious worship and, therefore, were not entitled to unemployment 
benefits upon being fired for the use of peyote. 
32. J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 
YALE L.J. 1935, 1952 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993)). 
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manner. Perhaps what is most unsettling about Feldman’s cri-
tique is that he largely views history and the development of 
the separation of church and state from his perspective only. In 
effect, he adopts the position that he criticizes throughout his 
book. Rather than describing or analyzing the current state of 
religious freedom in America from various perspectives, Feld-
man remains behind the lens of what he calls the religious 
“outgroup.”  
While the Christian majority needs to rethink its views re-
garding whether the Constitution truly protects the rights of 
non-mainstream religionists, or those that do not follow any re-
ligion altogether, the minority religionists may also need to re-
think their view of the Christian majority. Feldman’s attempt 
to lump all Christian religions into the “majority” is an unfair 
generalization that leads to inaccuracies. The assertion that 
Christianity is based on anti-Semitic rhetoric is particularly 
questionable. Further, by failing to view diversity within the 
Christian religion itself, Feldman misses an important point: 
religious diversity is not necessarily controlled by one majority 
group. Rather, there are differences among the various Chris-
tian denominations, which ultimately view the separation of 
church and state from a variety of perspectives. These differ-
ences, in turn, help prevent the government from favoring one 
religion over another, or religion over nonreligion. By failing to 
take these differences into account, Feldman demonstrates how 
everyone, even followers of “outgroup” religions, needs to view 
religion from the “other’s” perspective. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In a society such as America, where differences in all as-
pects of life abound, it is more effective to recognize such differ-
ences than suppress them. Rather than divorcing religion from 
all dialogue, including among believers of the same faith, we 
should learn to embrace and protect all religions. Rather than 
asking me not to wish a fellow Christian a “Merry Christmas,” 
we should address, respect, and protect religious differences, 
whether they are found in religious “outgroups” or within the 
Christian majority. Finally, rather than delineating all that is 
wrong with the separation of church and state, writers, aca-
demics, and citizens should develop solutions to the problem of 
religious hegemony. Perhaps the best means of maintaining a 
proper separation of church and state, without completely 
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eliminating religion from political and social spheres, is to fol-
low the Supreme Court’s neutral treatment of religion and non-
religion. By so doing, he who wishes to practice a faith accord-
ing to his conscience may do so, irrespective of the 
denomination or sect involved. That way, America truly can be-
come a principled nation where religious diversity is not only 
protected but encouraged. 
Lindsay L. Welch 
 
